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Introduction
A signi…cant part of the literature on strategic network formation has focused on variants of the 'connections' model studied by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . The common idea of this literature is that being part of a network allows agents to bene…t not only from their direct links but also from indirect connections to other agents in the network. In contrast, the costs of network participation in these models are only associated with the creation of direct links. However, as Blume et al. (2011) observe in many networks studied in economics and other disciplines the structure of costs and bene…ts is inverted. As an example from economics they refer to the extensive body of work on issues related to systemic risk in …nancial networks. In those networks two institutions form a link by signing a loan agreement from which each party derives a bene…t. A failure by one institution to meet its obligations in ‡icts costs not only to the two parties that have signed the agreement but also to other institutions connected to them, directly or indirectly, by other …nancial agreements.
The above observation motivated Blume et al. (2011) to study the formation of networks with this alternative general payo¤ structure. They have restricted their analysis to undirected graphs where information can ‡ow in either direction along a link. Using stability as a solution concept that allows them to make predictions about which network structures are more likely to form they …nd stable networks that consist of fully connected disjoint subgraphs (cliques). Such arrangements might be o¤ering a good description of some examples of social networks they mentioned in their paper (e.g. formation of groups that minimize the risk of disease epidemics and the organization of cladenstine operations) but de…nitely less so for …nancial systems that have network structures which are connected but incomplete. 1 In such networks there is always a path connecting any of the nodes (…nancial institutions) with every other node (ignoring for the moment that links can also be directed), however, not all nodes are directly linked with every other node.
In this paper, we argue that by distinguishing between directed and undirected graphs we can explain such variations in network structures. We begin by analyzing the formation of undirected networks in a variant of the Blume et al. (2011) model. As in their model (a) agents derive a bene…t by forming a link, and (b) each agent fails independently with some …xed probability. The di¤erence in the two models is related to the way the costs associated with such failures spread through the network. In their model after a failure each node with some probability becomes live and shocks can only be transmitted through live nodes. In our model all nodes are live and thus a¤ected by the shock, however, the magnitude of the losses for each node depends on its distance from the one that initially failed. We con…rm that when links are undirected there exist stable networks that consist of fully connected disjoint subgraphs but we go one step further by showing that these are the only structures that can be stable.
Then, we turn our attention to directed networks where shocks can be only transmitted along directed paths. In …nancial networks an outgoing (ingoing) link means that the institution represented by the node is a borrower (lender). Thus, the link captures the ‡ow of …nancial liabilities. By having only a subset of nodes being live the Blume et al. (2011) model mimics the transmission of shocks in directed networks. However, there is an important di¤erence. In their model the paths are exogenously determined but in our model are equilibrium outcomes. The direction of the links are determined by the strategic decisions of agents. We …nd that the most likely stable structures are complete directed networks (tournaments). More interestingly, we …nd that small variations in the parameters of the model can signi…cantly a¤ect the vulnerability of the network to a failure of any randomly chosen node. In particular, we …nd that by either slightly decreasing the bene…t derived from forming a link or slightly decreasing the cost associated with being hit by a shock we can move from a network structure where there is only one (critical) agent whose failure would a¤ect all other agents to a stable structure where all agents become critical.
The prediction that stable networks with directed links are connected …ts well with what we know about the structure of …nancial networks, however, our prediction that such networks are complete is not. With that in mind we next consider a modi…ed version of our model that allows for aggregate externalities. More speci…cally, we consider the case where the costs su¤ered by each agent following a shock on the network is increasing in the number of agents being a¤ected. Now we …nd that there are parameter values such that any stable network is connected but not complete. Moreover, we …nd that such networks are more likely to be asymmetric that is also a feature of real networks.
In the following section, we describe a few examples of networks from economics and other disciplines, both undirected and directed, whose general structure is captured by our model. 2 We also o¤er examples of aggregate externalities that might generate network structures similar to those predicted by our …nal version of our model..
Contagion in Social and Economic Networks
The …rst three are examples of undirected networks and the following two are examples of directed networks.
Contagious diseases and group size As Blume et al. (2011) observe there is a tradeo¤ related to the formation of social groups. Larger clusters increase the bene…ts of participants, however, they also increase the risk of contagion. This trade-o¤ is clearly illustrated in the study by Hamilton et al. (2007) of hunter-gatherer societies where they make the distinction between cohesive and disruptive forces in the process of group formation and among the latter they identify the spread of diseases.
Underground resistance networks This is another of the examples o¤ered by Blume et al. (2011) . Participants in such organizations bene…t by working in groups but also there is a risk that the group might be in…ltrated. Chai (1993) explores this trade-o¤ in the context of groups that resist governments while Morselli et al. (2007) do the same for criminal networks.
Globalization and the international transmission of shocks The free movement of goods and services, intermediate inputs in production (labor and physical capital) and …nancial capital can be welfare enhancing during times of prosperity but they also facilitate the transmission of regional shocks around the globe. This trade-o¤ has been studied by Imbs (2004) , Kose et al. (2003) and since then it has been an active topic of research.
What all three examples mentioned above have in common is that links are symmetric and thus undirected. 3 In all three examples the size of the group is a source of tension between opposing forces. Larger groups confer bene…ts to participants as there are more opportunities for collaboration. However, larger groups also expose a greater number of participants to shocks in their network (new virus, an agent caught by the authorities, a macroeconomic downturn). How big the network will be it will depend on balancing the costs and bene…ts of participation. The risk of losing a member in clandestine operations might be unacceptable and thus would keep the size of the network small. In contrast, the international trade network has been expanding both by enlisting more trading partners and reducing barriers to trade.
Financial networks and systemic risk This is our …rst example of a directed network. In the description we o¤ered above shocks are transmitted around the network from borrowers to lenders. The inability of a borrower institution to meet its obligations with its lenders can cause a cascade of failures through the system. The lenders of the initially failing institution might be unable to meet their own obligations and this process can keep going till the system is cleared (e.g., Eisenberg and Noe, 2001 ). 4 Shocks can also be transmitted from lenders to borrowers when the former group suddenly interrupts established credit lines that it has earlier provided to the latter group. Episodes of market freezes usually take place before the onset of a crisis as lenders anticipate that borrowers will, in the near future, have a hard time repaying their debts (e.g. Diamond and Rajan; 2011). 5 During a crisis, systemic losses can get magni…ed because of '…re sales'. 6 As Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have shown the simultaneous liquidation of assets by multiple institutions can depress the market prices of these assets which in turn further deteriorates the balance sheets of other institutions that hold similar assets thus potentially leading to further failures.
Firm linkages and macroeconomic fat tails Directed networks are also useful for understanding the causes of fat tails in the distribution of macroeconomic shocks. Recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2012 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2017b have shown that the interaction between the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and the structure of the network can become a shock 3 There are exceptions but to address them we need a more specialized model. For example, as Chai (1993) suggests while it is true that exposure to the risk of in…ltration keeps the size of resistance groups small, these groups can be further protected by having a hierachical structure where every person is in contact with no more that three other members (one above and two below). 4 For excellent literature reviews see Acemoglu et al. 2017a, Babus and Allen (2009) and Glasserman and Young (2016) . 5 For a network approach to market freezes see Gabrieli and Georg (2014) . 6 See Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a review of the literature.
4 ampli…cation mechanism that can explain 'abnormal' shocks at the aggregate level. 7 They analyze networks where nodes represent …rms that buy from and sell goods to each other thus creating a web of complex relationships.
In Acemoglu et al. (2017b) they show that light-tailed risks (small deviations from the normal case) in conjunction with some lack of balance in terms of economic importance across the sectors of the economy can give rise to macroeconomic fat tails. One possible explanation for the deviation of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks from the normal case can be related to what in the past macroeconomists have identi…ed as aggregate demand externalities. Examples of such externalities have been studied in a variety of contexts, such as search in labor markets (Diamond, 1982) , coordination of economic activity (Cooper and John, 1988) , market structure (Kiyotaki, 1988 ) and industrial development (Murphy et al., 1989) .
By introducing in our model aggregate external e¤ects we are able to show that directed networks, such as those considered above, though connected are not complete. We also …nd that such networks are more likely to me asymmetric which is consistent with real-life macroeconomic and …nancial networks.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to a quickly expanding literature on the endogenous formation of economic and social networks. Early work focused on variants of the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) connectionist model. 8 We focus our literature review on works that consider network formation in environments with systemic risk.
As we mentioned above, the most closely related paper to ours is Blume et al. (2011). They restrict their attention to undirected graphs. However, the transmission of a shock is restricted to spread only through live nodes. In contrast, in the undirected graph version of our model all nodes are live but we allow for losses to be discounted as the distance of nodes from the one hit by the shock goes up. The two models become identical by setting equal to one (a) the probability of a node being live in Blume et al. (2011) , and (b) the discount factor in our model. In addition, to …nding, as they do, that there exist stable networks that consist of disjoint fully connected subgraphs we also show that any stable network must have that structure.
Erol and Vohra (2014) also consider formation of undirected links and derive a similar result, however, they do so from a network formation game that has a quite di¤erent structure. In their model any pair of agents linked together play a coordination game, each agent deciding whether to default or not and where their expected payo¤s also depend on their beliefs about the default strategies of all other agents. At an earlier stage agents form undirected links anticipating the later stage possibilities.
Our work is also related to a number of papers in the …nance literature that explore the links between network structure and systemic risk. In particular, there has been a lot of work attempting to understand which types of network structures are more vulnerable to systemic risk (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2015; Elliott et al., 2014) .
Recently, there has also been some work on the formation of such networks. Cohen-Cole et al. (2010) study competition in the …nancial market where participants form undirected links. In Babus (2013) …nancial institutions form links to insure themselves against the probability of system wide default. In contrast, in the …nancial interpretation of our model …nancial institutions are participating in an interbank market. Acemoglu et al. (2014) also study network formation but they exogenously restrict the links that are allowed to be formed. When such restrictions are lifted then the complete network can be stable. By introducing aggregate externalities we have derived alternative equilibrium structures.
Lastly, Caballero and Simpsek (2013) also consider externalities in …nancial markets within a network approach. They introduce the concept of 'price complexity externality' to refer to the negative externality imposed to the rest of the system by the liquidation of assets by failing institutions.
Undirected Networks
There are  agents represented as nodes on a graph (network). Let  = f1  g denote the set of nodes. A link between two nodes indicates that the corresponding agents have a direct relationship. Let   denote the complete network where all agents are directly connected and let  = f j  µ   g denote the set of all possible graphs. For two agents  and  who are directly linked in network  we write  2 .
The following notations will be useful. We will write  +  for the network that we obtain when we add link  to an existing network . Similarly, we will write  ¡  for the network that we obtain after deleting link . A walk between agents  and  is de…ned as a sequence of agents beginning with  and ending with  such that for every pair of adjacent agents in the sequence there exists a direct link. A path between agents  and  is de…ned as a sequence of agents beginning with  and ending with  such that for every pair of adjacent agents there exists a direct link and each agent appears only once in the sequence. We let () denote the number of direct links in the shortest path between agents  and . A cycle is formed by adding the link  to a path between agents  and . A complete cycle is a cycle where all the agents that belong on the cycle are connected with each other. An empty cycle is a cycle that there are no links between any two agents that belong on the cycle and are not adjacent.
For any network  we let () denote the set of all distinct connected subgraphs and () the set of all isolated nodes. Then
We let  0 denote that the subgraph  0 is complete. 9 For any player  we de…ne    = f : () = g, that is the set of agents with a shortest distance from agent  equal to . Let j   j denote the cardinality of the set. Then we have
Notice that j  1 j is equal to the degree of node . 9 Notice that there is a distinction between a complete cycle and a complete connected subgraph. An agent on a cycle path can be linked to an agent that does not belong to the cycle path. This is not allowed in the latter case. 6 Next, we de…ne the bene…ts and costs from network participation. With probability  one of the nodes of the network is hit by a shock. Given that all nodes are hit by a shock with the same probability, the unconditional probability that a node is hit by a shock is equal to   . 10 Agents derive bene…t  from each direct link as long as one of the following two conditions holds: Either the network is not hit by a shock or the network is hit by the shock but they are not connected, neither directly nor indirectly, to the agent hit by the shock. There is no bene…t from indirect links. The cost to an agent of being hit by a shock is equal to   1. Other agents of the network will su¤er losses only if they are connected to the agent who is hit by the shock (they have to belong to the same connected graph). Suppose that agent  is hit by a shock. For any agent  connected to agent  this indirect cost is given by  () , where 0    1; thus, the cost is declining with the number of links in the shortest path between the two agents.
Suppose that  0 2 () and let j 0 j denote the cardinality of  0 . Then, the expected net payo¤   ( 0  ) of agent  2  0 is given by:
The …rst term is equal to the expected bene…t derived from belonging in a subset of the network  represented by a connected subgraph  0 . The subgraph has j 0 j nodes and thus the probability that one of the corresponding agents is hit by a shock is equal to j 0 j  . As long as no agent that belongs to the subgraph is hit by the shock agent  will derive a bene…t  from each of the direct links where the total number of these links is equal to j  1 j. The second term is equal to the corresponding expected costs. Each agent fails with probability  
. When an agent who belongs to the subgraph is hit by the shock all agents su¤er a loss that is equal to  times a discount factor that depends on the shortest distance of the agent from the one hit by the shock. Thus, costs due to contagion rise as the distance form the agent hit by the shock declines.
Stability
As in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we use the notion of pair-wise stability to allow us to make predictions about the types of networks that are likely to form. The formation of a new link requires the approval of both agents forming the link. But any players can severe a link unilaterally. This is a relatively weak notion of stability given that, as we will see below, allows for stable networks where every participant would prefer to severe all links simultaneously. In Section 4, we discuss alternative notions of stability where such cases would be eliminated. Still, the notion of pair-wise stability by su¢ciently restricting the set of stable networks allows us to make interesting predictions. Moreover, as Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) note pairwise stability is independent of any particular dynamic process through which the network is formed. 10 In Section 4, we discuss alternative speci…cations of the distribution of shocks.
De…nition 1 A network, , is stable if no agent  prefers to severe a link, and no pair of agents  and  prefers to form link .
The following result addresses the two benchmark cases.
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Lemma 1 (a) if
 then the empty network is stable, and
 , is stable.
then neither the complete network nor the empty network are stable.
Our next result shows that stable networks always exist. In particular, as in Blume et al. (2011), we will show that we can always construct stable networks that consist of disjoint connected subgraphs. Then, we will go one step further and show that any stable network has that structure.
Proposition 1 Stable networks always exist and consist of disjoint complete subgraphs.
Example 1 Let  = 9,  = 09,  = 5, and  = 1. Then the network comprised of two complete subgraphs of sizes 5 and 4, respectively, is stable (see Figure 2 .1).
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Proposition1 has identi…ed some su¢ecient results for stability but by no means are necessary. 13 Even if a network might not be stable in the presence of isolated agents might be so in their absence. For example, a subgraph of size, say  0 might not be stable if there are isolated agents, however, it might be stable if the smallest size complete connected subgraph in the network exceeds some minimum value. An implication of the last comment is that a multiplicity of stable networks is alomost certain.
Remark 1 As we metioned above pair-wise stability is a very weak concept. For example, the stability condition for complete networks given in Proposition 1 might hold even if the expected payo¤ of all agents is negative and thus they would prefer to be isolated. This is because form the moment that the network is complete the net bene…t of breaking a single link can be negative even if the agent can be better o¤ had been able to severe all links at once. However, we can eliminate such networks if we restrict our attention to the (very realistic) case where the staring point of every network is the empty network (all 11 All proofs are presented in the Appendix. 12 Notice that (A2) in the proof given in the Appendix is satis…ed for these parameter values. In addition, we need to ensure that no agent belonging to the size 4 subgraph would like to link with an agent belonging to the size 5 subgraph. The expected payo¤ from creating the new link is given by
which is less than the expected payo¤ from not creating the link given by (A1) for  = 9 and  = 4. agents are isolated). Under this restriction we can provide an upper bound on the size of subgraphs that can be parts of stable networks. De…ne  ¤¤ () as the maximum value of  such that the following inequalities hold
¤¤ is equal to the largest size of fully connected subgraph that an isolated agent would wish to join and thus sets an upper bound for the size of such subgraphs. Notice that the lower bound can be an isolated agent. To see this suppose that  ¤¤ =  ¡ 1. In that case, one stable network consists of a completely connected subgraph of size  ¡ 1 and an isolated agent.
Next, we show that any stable network consists of disjoint fully connected subgraphs. We …rst show that completeness is necessary for stability.
Proposition 2 Any incomplete connected subgraph is not stable.
Then, the following result follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 2 Stable networks exist and each stable network consists of a collection of connected subgraphs.
Stable networks respond to a trade-o¤ between large size structures that bring more bene…ts to participants and small size structures that protect them from shocks. Given that indirect connections do not confer any bene…ts but are still potentially harmful they are absent in stable networks. The small size of hunter-gatherer societies might have indeed protected them against epidemics as the small size of resistance groups protects them against in…ltration. In contrast, when the expected costs of contagion are low relative to the bene…ts of new connections the formation of large complete networks becomes possible.
For example, despite the losses in welfare resulting from the transmission of macroeconomic shocks there is still a tendency for expanding globalization by opening international borders to allow for the movement of goods and services, inputs in production and …nancial capital.
Ex Ante E¢ciency vs Ex Post Systemic Losses
Up to this point we have been focusing on the types of network structures that are more likely to form. Now we turn our attention to relative performance. For the types of networks that we are interested there are two potentially interesting ways of measuring performance. The …rst one is having a measure of ex ante performance as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) who used the sum of expected utilities of network participants. The second way provides a measure of ex post performance by focusing on 6the magnitude of potential systemic losses after a shock on the network. Clearly, these losses are minimized by not having any links at all, that is all agents are isolated, j()j = . Such a measure ignores the bene…ts of creating networks in the …rst place. Nevertheless, such a measure can be bene…cial to policymakers who are interested in minimizing the damage form contagion. With that in mind, we are going to identify among all stable networks the one that minimizes ex post losses.
De…nition 2 A network 
¤ is ex ante e¢cient if it maximizes the sum of the payo¤s of all agents:
Corollary 3 E¢cient networks are stable.
The expected payo¤ of an agent  belonging to one of the complete subgraphs of size  is given by
. By maximizing this payo¤ with respect to  we can …nd the size of a completely connected subgraph that o¤ers the maximum expected payo¤ to its members. 15 Setting the f.o.c. equal to 0 and solving for  we get:
Notice that for a …xed size, , of the network, the higher is the probability that the network will be hit by a shock the lower is the size of the optimal subgraph. If  mod = 0 then the network consisting of completely connected subgraphs of size is the one that maximizes ex ante e¢ciency. If  mod  0 then not all agents will be receiving the same payo¤ 14 Notice that the expected payo¤ of each  2 () is equal to ¡   . This expression cancels out in all our derivations with only exceptions those in the last section were we introduce aggregate externalities. For this reason we opted to keep it rather making an ad hoc introduction later in the paper. 15 Given that is probably not an integer we need to compare the payo¤s of subgraphs of sizes equal to the …rst integer higher than with the payo¤s of subgraphs of sizes equal to the …rst integer lower than. We will ignore this complication and the most e¢cient network might not feature subgraphs of size. However, for high values ,  and  or low values of , will be small relatively to  in which case it is more likely that the e¢cient network mainly consists of subgraphs of size.
Next, we consider the relationship between stability and systemic losses. Clearly, the magnitude of systemic losses following a shock decline as the size of subgraphs gets smaller. Therefore, we are looking for the smallest fully connected subgraph that is stable when all other subgraphs have the same size. 16 Denote the size of such subgraph by · . If the following inequality holds an agent belonging to a fully connected subgraph of size ·  would prefer not to link with another agent belonging to another similar subgraph:
The left-hand side is equal to the expected payo¤ from being part of a completely connected subgraph of size . If the agent links with an agent in another similar subgraph the size of the new network will double and thus the probability that the subgraph will be hit by a shock also doubles. There is the additional bene…t  from the extra link but also there are additional costs. There is an additional expected cost
 related to the new link and an additional expected cost
2 from the new indirect links. ·  is the smallest value of  such that the above inequality is satis…ed. In that case a network consisting of fully connected subgraphs of size ·  is stable.
Example 2 Let  = 6,  = 1,  = 1,  = 7, and  = . Then = 3. The above inequality is satis…ed for  = 2 but not for  = 1 and thus we have ·  = 2. Notice that this example also trivially satis…es the stability condition for the complete network.
The above example identi…es a tension between stability, e¢ciency and the size of systemic losses. The observation that stability can be satis…ed with networks that are much larger than those that maximize e¢ciency is not necessarily due to the notion of stability that we use. When agents make decisions about forming or breaking a link they ignore the negative impact that these decisions have on the payo¤s of other agents. This negative externality implies that agents would tend to form too many links relative to the number of links of the e¢cient network. 17 
Directed Networks
Up to this point we have treated symmetrically two agents forming a link. In our model the paths formed by the links of the network capture the path of contagion following a shock. Thus far, we have allowed the ‡ows to follow both directions de…ned by a link. After a link is formed when any one of the two agents is hit by a shock then the other agent also su¤ers losses. However, in many applications contagion ‡ows only in one direction which depends on the nature of the relationship between the two agents. For example, for any two linked banks in a banking network there is a lender bank and a borrower bank.
When the borrower bank is hit by a shock and is unable to meet its obligations to the lender bank the latter also su¤ers a loss. The lender bank might also play the role of a borrower bank in another link in which case the shock can be further transmitted. 18 We will use directed links to capture these one way ‡ows. In what follows  captures not only the fact that agents  and  are linked but also that shocks are transmitted from agent  to agent . Graphically, there will be an arrow between nodes  and  pointing at node . Using the new interpretation of  we can de…ne, directed walks, directed paths and directed cycles using the de…nitions for walks, paths and cycles o¤ered in the last section. () now denotes the shortest directed path from  to . 19 We let  ()   = f : () = g denote the set of agents with a shortest distance to agent  equal to  and  ()   = f : () = g denote the set of agents with a shortest distance from agent  equal to . Notice that the cardinality of these sets for  = 1 are the in-degree and the out-degree of node , respectively. When there is no path leading from agent  to agent  we set () ¼ 1. Lastly, a Hamiltonian path is a directed path that visits each node exactly once while a Hamiltonian cycle is obtained from a Hamiltonian path by adding the link from the last node to the …rst node.
We de…ne the bene…ts and costs from participation in directed networks in a similar way as we have done for undirected networks. As above, the unconditional probability that an agent is hit by a shock is equal to   . As long as there is no agent hit by a shock each agent obtains a bene…t  form each direct link irrespectively of the link's direction. 20 As above, an agent hit by a shock su¤ers cost . The only di¤erence is that in directed networks other agents of the network will su¤er losses only if they are connected to the agent who is hit by the shock by a directed path. Say agent  is hit by a shock. For any agent  connected to agent  this indirect cost is given by  () , where 0    1; thus, as above the cost is declining with the number of links in the shortest path between the two agents. The loss of bene…ts that each agent su¤ers following any shock it will depend on the connectedness of the network. When agent  is hit by a shock all links located on directed paths beginning with agent  are a¤ected and the corresponding bene…ts are lost for both agents of each link. Consider the network  0 () obtained from the original network  after we have eliminated all a¤ected links. Each agent will keep the bene…ts from all their remaining direct links in either direction. Then we can write the expected payo¤ function of agent  from participating in the original network  as:
is de…ned in a similar way for the network obtained after agent  is hit by a shock. The costs are calculated as in the case for undirected networks but know only those paths leading to  are included. Notice that for all agents such that there is no directed path leading from them to agent ,  () ¼ 0.
The following example describes the expected net payo¤s obtained from being part of a complete directed networks of size 3. Understanding these simple networks is crucial for the general analysis of directed networks of any size greater than 3.
Example 3 Suppose that  = 3 (  ). There are two possible types of complete directed networks (see, Figure 3 .1) (a) Cycle: The links are , , . The network is symmetric as all agents have exactly the same net expected payo¤ given by:
In this case when any agent is hit by a shock all bene…ts are lost and all agents will su¤er losses.
(b) Complete Order: 21 The links are , , . The net expected payo¤s are given by:
When agent  is hit by a shock all links are a¤ected, when agent  is hit by a shock only link  is a¤ected and when agent  is hit by a shock none of the links are a¤ected. Remember that agents keep receiving bene…ts from links that are not a¤ected.
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The above example illustrates how small changes in connectivity can have large aggregate and distributional e¤ects.
Stability
De…nition 3 A network, , is stable if no agent  prefers to severe a link, and no pair of agents  and  prefer to form either link  or link .
The de…nition of stability is similar as that used in the case of undirected networks. The only di¤erence is that now stability requires that any pair of agents not linked do not want to form a link in any of the two directions.
. Then the empty network is not stable. 21 A complete directed graph of size  is a complete order if we can label the nodes  1     such that there is a link form   to   , link , if and only if   . Notice there are links form   to all other nodes and there are links to  1 from all other nodes. A complete directed graph is also known as a tournament. 22 In a banking network after a bank is hit by a shock, its debtors (other banks that have borrowed from it) still need to meet their obligations. When the empty network is not stable a link  is always bene…cial to agent  (the origin of the link). In contrast, whether the link is bene…cial to agent  it will depend on the distribution of shortest paths that include link . If any agent along these paths is hit by a shock agent  will also su¤er a loss. In contrast, the only bene…t that agent  obtains from such paths is from the link to agent . Below we will show that small changes in this trade-o¤ can have large consequences for the structure of the network and, hence, for aggregate losses due to shocks. For making these comparisons we de…ne an agent as critical if when after this agent is hit by a shock all links of the network are a¤ected. We begin by looking at the extreme case where any shortest path larger than 1 is unstable.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the empty network is not stable and (1
Then the only stable network is a complete order tournament.
In the case of the above proposition there is a single critical agent associated with the single Hamiltonian path (see, Figure 3 .2) For the above result, we have imposed the constraint that directed paths of length two are not stable. Next, we relax the constraint by allowing directed paths of length two but not directed paths of length three. The following result identi…es conditions such that there exists a Hamiltonian cycle; that is every agent is critical. 23 
Proposition 5 Suppose that (a) the empty network is not stable, (b)
Then for odd 23 There is quite a lot of work trying to establish the maximum number of hamiltonial paths and hamiltonian cycles in tournaments (e.g. Adler et al., 2001) . It is well known that the number can be very large. Here, we are interested in the existence of such paths and cycles when we impose restrictions on the maximum allowable shortest path. According to Proposition 4 when chains (shortest path greater than one) are too costly the only connected stable network is the complete order tournament where there is exactly one critical player. In Proposition 5 we have shown that when we allow for shortest paths equal to two then the conclusions change dramatically. There are stable tournaments where every agent is critical because there exists a Hamiltonian cycle (see, Figure 3. 3). Any shock will a¤ect all agents. Of course, the complete order tournament is still stable as there are many other tournaments with the number of critical agents ranging from one to . In fact, it might be possible to construct stable networks that are not connected but which are comprised of sets of disjoint complete subgraphs. The reasoning behind this argument is based on what we know from our results related to undirected networks. However, there is a crucial di¤erence. When the networks are directed the only network with isolated agents that can be stable is the empty network. As long as the empty network is not stable then any agent belonging to a connected subgraph would prefer to link with an isolated agent (in either direction but an outgoing link would be preferable) and any isolated player would de…nitely prefer to link with a connected subgraph as long as the link is outgoing (the agent might also prefer an incoming link).
The last observation suggests that the formation of stable networks that are not connected are less likely. Furthermore, our results for undirected networks also suggest that the only stable networks are complete. We have already shown that this is the case when the shortest path cannot exceed one. It follows that relaxing this constraint should not alter our conclusion that incomplete but connected networks are not stable. 24 However, the real-life directed economic networks that have the general structure of our model (e.g. input-output and …nancial) are connected but incomplete. Below we consider a simple extension of our basic model that will restrict the connectivity of stable structures.
Aggregate Externalities
Up to this point, we have assumed that the cost  is independent of the number of agents that are a¤ected by the shock. However, both the macroeconomics and the …nancial economics literatures suggest that there exist mechanisms generating aggregate externalities that exacerbate the impact of shocks on each market participant. We capture these externalities by allowing the cost associated with a shock to be increasing in the number of a¤ected agents,. Thus, we now write  (), where (1)  0 and  0  0. The following result has importnat implications for the stability of the network. The above result does not imply that these complete networks are not pair-wise stable as breaking a single link might not necessarily increase the expected payo¤. However, as we explain in Section 4, this will not be the case if we introduce a stronger notion of stability where agents are allowed to brake any number of links.
Moreover, any network with isolated agents cannot be stable. This is because creating a link directed from the isolated agent to any agent in the network will increase the payo¤ of both agents. Thus, stable networks are very likely to be connected but incomplete (see, Figure 3 .4). In this example, if (4) is su¢ciently high then agents  and  will prefer not to link in either direction as in that case a failure of the agent from whom the link originated would a¤ect the whole network, thus increasing the cost to (4). As the network stands the maximum number of agents that will be a¤ected after a shock is 3 in which case the cost will be equal to (3).
The general e¤ect of aggregate externalities is to decrease the average number of agents that can be a¤ected by a shock. However, that number can be small even in networks that are connected but not comple. Furthermore, as the above example suggests such networks can be asymmentric a standard feature of real-life networks.
Final Remarks
In this section, we consider the implications for our main results of changing some of the main assumptions of our model.
Stability
The notion of pairwise stability that we have used throughout this paper is weak. In some cases it allows for stable networks that would not survive a stronger notion while in other cases has complicated the proofs of some of the results.
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we have assumed that agents cannot break more than one link. Alternatively, consider the case where agents can break as many links as they like. One implication of this change is that the proof of part (cii) of Lemma 5 (Appendix) can be greatly simpli…ed. While all other steps of the proof are straightforward, this particular case is not and only arises because our stability notion does not allow agent  to break both links on the cycle. Even if the expected payo¤ from retaining both links is negative there is no bene…t in severing only one of them. Under the alternative notion of stability  would break both links thus violating the supposition that the subgraph is stable and completing the proof at that point.
The notion of pairwise instability might allow stable networks where each agent's next expected payo¤ is less that ¡   . In contrast, such networks would not be stable had we allowed agents to break more than one link. We identi…ed such a case above when we considered the impact of aggregate externalities on network formation. By breaking a single link an agent loses the bene…t of having the link without signi…cantly reducing the cost given that the probability that the network is hit by a shock has remained the same.
Discounting We have introduced discounting (decay) in our model to capture the possibility that costs related to shocks are decreasing as the shortest distance from the agent hit by the shock goes up. Further, to keep the exposition simple we have followed other examples in the literature (see, Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Watts, 2002) and have assumed geometric discounting. Our results still hold if we allow for a weakly decreasing decay function.
Distribution of shocks
We have only allowed shocks that directly a¤ect only one agent. Allowing for multiple shocks, either independent or correlated, would de…nitely a¤ect quantitatively our results but not qualitatively. In all cases multiplicity of shocks would increase the parameter space within which the empty network is stable. For the case of undirected graphs it would also decrease the size of stable disjoint fully connected subgraphs. For the case of directed graphs it could make more likely the formation of networks that are not fully connected.
Nodes and links In many interesting applications of directed graphs links can be bidirectional. For example, in …nancial networks two institutions can hold claims against each other. Generally, bankruptcy procedures do not allow the bilateral clearance of such claims following the failure of an institution as it would violate priority rules (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001 ). Thus, allowing for bidirectional links would not fundamentally a¤ect our analysis. We only observe that as the number of such links increases the network would behave more as an undirected one.
Moreover, in many applications of directed graphs (…nancial and macroeconomic networks) links and nodes can be weighted. Weights on links would capture the size of the transaction while weights on nodes would capture the size of the institution and thus potentially the probability of being hit by a shock. Introducing weights it is a potentially interesting area for future research.
Dynamics In the present work, we have concentrated on the properties of networks that in principle could be formed but we have ignored the dynamics of network formation and thus potentially the likelihood of these networks being formed. Our main objective in this paper has been to extend the analysis of Blume et al. (2011) to networks with directed links. The main message of the paper does not depend on any particular dynamics. However, such dynamics can be important when we consider particular applications. 25 Moreover, as we have already argued above, we might be able to eliminate some of the less appealing stable networks (e.g. those where each agent's expected net payo¤ is negative) as dynamically unstable.
Appendix (Proofs)
5.1. Proof of Lemma 1 (a) Consider the empty network and any pair of agents  and . The probability that one of the two agents is hit by a shock is equal to   in which case, if the link has been formed, the agent not hit by the shock will bear an indirect loss . With probability 1 ¡ 2  , none of the two agents is hit by a shock in which case each agent obtains bene…t . Thus, if
 the two agents will decide not to form the link. (b) The payo¤ to an agent  who is part of the complete network is given by:
Agent  by severing a link, say with agent , loses bene…t  when there is no shock on the network and this happens with probability 1 ¡ . Given that () = 2 by severing the link the expected cost of participating in the network for agent  has been reduced by
The proof follows form comparing bene…ts and losses. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove the proposition in two steps. We will …rst show that the existence of a stable complete subgraph is su¢cient for the existence of at least one stable network. Then we will show that a stable complete subgraph exists.
Lemma 3
If there exists a stable complete subgraph  0 then there also exists at least one stable network.
Proof Let¯ 0¯= . Suppose that  mod  =  and consider the network with ¡  complete subgraphs each with  nodes and 1 complete subgraph of size . To prove the proposition we need to show that the complete subgraph of size  is stable, given that all other subgraphs are of size  and thus, by supposition, stable. The expected payo¤ of an agent  belonging to one of the complete subgraphs of size  is given by:
One of the necessary conditions for the stability of the subgraph is that agent  does not want to severe a link. The new payo¤ of an agent who severs a link is given by
, and thus the stability condition, which by supposition holds, is given by:
Next, we consider the stability of a complete subgraph of size . The stability of the rest of the subgraphs implies that none of the agents belonging to the other subgraphs are willing to link with any agent belonging to another subgraph. In order to complete the proof we need to show that none of the agents in the complete subgraph of size  prefers to severe a link, whcih follows form the fact that the left-hand side of (4) is decreasing in  and the inequality   . ¤ Suppose that (1) holds; that is neither the empty network nor the complete network are stable. Clearly, if this is not the case existence of stable networks is trivially satis…ed. Then the lemma implies that it is su¢cient to show that a stable complete subgraph exists. The existence of a stable complete subgraph of cardinality  requires that two conditions are satis…ed: (a) no agent prefers to break a link, that is
 (1 ¡ ) , and (b) that no isolated agent would like to join the graph, that is
(Stability also requires that none of the agents belonging to the subgraph would like to be linked with agents outside the graph but this constraint does not bind. Further, if no isolated agent would like to join the complete subgraph then this will also be the case for any other agent belonging to any subgraph as joining an even larger network always decreases expected payo¤.) Then it su¢ces to show that if (1) holds then there exists  2 [2  ¡ 1] such that the following inequalities are satis…ed:
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from the observations that for  = 2 the second inequality is satis…ed by (1) and for  =  ¡ 1 the …rst inequality is satis…ed by (1). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the following results:
Lemma 4 If a complete subgraph of size  is not stable because agents would prefer to severe a link then any connected subgraph of size  is also not stable because agents would prefer to severe a link.
Proof We need to consider two cases:
(a) A broken link does to alter the size of the subgraph: Form (A2) we know that instability implies that
The left hand side is equal to the expected loss from breaking a link which does not depend on the structure of the subgraph as long as its size is equal to . When the original graph is not complete then it must be the case that for no agent the expected bene…t of breaking a link can be lower than    (1 ¡ )  (the expected bene…t corresponding to breaking a link of a complete subgraph) and there must be at least one agent whose expected bene…t must be higher. Similarly, expected costs because of the direct link decline by at least    but now they can decline even more because the shortest path to other agents has increased. This is because after the break of a link in the complete network the shortest path between the two corresponding agents has increased to 2 and when the subgraph is not complete the shortest path can be even higher.
(b) A broken link decreases the size of the subgraph: The lowest expected payo¤ that an agent can gain be severing a link is when the other agent is not connected to anyone else. This is because, …rst, the probability of being a¤ected by a shock depends on the size of the subgraph which in this case only declines by 1, and, second, there are no additional bene…ts from cost reduction given that the shortest path to other agents is not a¤ected. For such an agent the expected bene…t from participating in the network prior to the break of the link is equal to
 and the corresponding bene…t after the break is equal to
There is also a reduction in expected costs by   . These conditions imply that the agent would prefer to break the link if
  0 which is implied by the instability condition of the complete subgraph. ¤ Lemma 5 Consider a complete subgraph of size  where no agent prefers to severe a link. Then any incomplete connected subgraph of size  is not stable.
Proof Notice that the fact that no agent prefers to severe a link when the subgraph is complete implies that (A2) holds. Consider any incomplete connected subgraph of size  where no agent prefers to severe a link. (If this is not the case the lemma holds.) Then there exist agents    such that
We will show that either agents  and  would like to form link  or that there exists another pair of agents taht are not linked but would prefer to be linked. We focus on the decision of agent  given that the decision of agent  is symmetric. We need to consider three cases:
(a)  is a terminal node: agent 's expected payo¤ from creating a link with agent  is given by the left-hand side of (A2) and therefore is positive. Figure 5 .3 -there are two shortest paths from  to any node in  2 ). In this case, the shortest path form  to  is not a¤ected by the decision of  to break or to retain link . However, if link  is created then the shortest path from agent  to agent  decreases by 1. Thus, in such case there is a possibility that while agent  prefers to retain link, agent  might prefer not to create link . However, given that the cycle is empty consider any three agents  0   0   0 such that  0  0 and  0  0 belong to the cycle. By supposition these agents prefer not to break these links. Then, following the arguments so far, it must be the case that either agent  0 prefers to create link  0  0 or there is another empty cycle such that  0  0 does not belong on the new cycle but  0  0 does. The proof of the lemma is completed with the observation that the size of the connected graph is …nite. If the original cycle is not empty then the arguments used in part (i) still hold and agent  would prefer to link with agent . ¤ The proof of the Proposition follows from the above two results. ¤ 
Proof of Proposition 3
The expected payo¤ of an agent  belonging to one of the complete subgraphs of size  is given by (A1). Subtracting ¡    and dividing by  ¡ 1 we get
 which is equal to each agent's net expected payo¤ from each node. We need to consider two cases:
(a)
Consider any other connected subgraph of cardinality  that is not complete. From each directly linked node an agent gets exactly the same expected payo¤ as the one derived form being a member of a complete subgraph. The expected payo¤ derived form nodes not directly linked is negative due to connectivity. Thus the total payo¤ is maximized when the subgraph is complete.
(b)
In this case the net expected payo¤ received form each node of a complete graph is negative and clearly the payo¤s of all agents would have been higher had they been isolated. ¤
Proof of Corollary 3
As we argued above an agent cannot achieve a higher payo¤ by breaking a single link. It is also the case that an agent cannot achieve a higher payo¤ by forming a link. Suppose that this is not the case and can achieve a higher payo¤ by connecting with an isolated agent. But the new payo¤ would be exactly the same as the one that the agent would obtain form being in a complete subgraph of size  + 1. This would also be true for any other agent contradicting the assumption that the original network was e¢cient. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider two isolated agents  and . It su¢ces to consider the expected payo¤ of agent  from creating the link  who su¤ers losses when any of the two agents is hit by a shock. The …rst term of the left-hand side of the inequality shows agent 's expected payo¤ from creating the link in the absence of any shock. Agent  will lose the bene…t of the link only when agent  is hit by a shock and, therefore, even when there is a shock on the network, with probability (¡1)  the link remains intact and agent  obtains bene…t . The right hand side shows the net expected cost from creating the link conditional on one of the two agents is hit by a shock. Keep in mind that an isolated agent is also hit by a shock with probability   and su¤ers a loss . After the creation of the link this cost is still there, however, with probability   agent  is hit by the shock and the expected loss to agent  equal to   . Thus, when the inequality holds both agents prefer to create the link. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider three agents    and links  and . The left-hand side of the inequality is equal to the expected payo¤ of agent . Agent  will lose the bene…t  from link  when either agent  or agent  is hit by a shock (but not agent ). Thus, agent  will bene…t from the link if either there is no shock (probability 1 ¡ ) or there is a shock but it does not a¤ect the link (probability
). The right-hand side of the inequality is equal to agent 's net expected cost from keeping the link in which case su¤ers losses when either agent  or agent  is hit by a shock.
Lemma 6 A directed cycle of three agents is not stable.
Proof The expected net payo¤ of any agent who is part of a directed cycle of three agents is equal to
Each agent bene…ts from two links as long as none of the three agents is hit by a shock. They su¤er losses when any of the three agents is hit by a shock. Next, consider the bene…t from breaking a link. Clearly, an agent who does that would break the incoming link. The expected payo¤ after the break of the link is given by
As long as the agent is not hit by a shock the link remains intact. Moreover, there is a loss only when the agent is hit by a shock. Then, for the agent to prefer to keep the link the following inequality must hold:
which by supposition is false. ¤ Lemma 7 All incomplete connected subgraphs are not stable.
Proof Suppose that this is not the case. Consider an incomplete connected subgraph where there is no agent who prefers to severe a link. We will show that there exists at least one pair of agents that would like to form a link. From the above lemma we know that the only way to fully connect three agents together is by a complete order. We also know that we cannot have links  and  without also having link  (if this is not the case then agent  would prefer to severe link ). To complete the proof we need to demonstrate that any group of three agents is fully connected by a complete order. We need to examine two cases:
(a) Consider three agents    and links  and . Thus, both links are directed to agent . Without any loss of generality, consider the creation of link . Agent  should agree to form the link unless there is another agent  and link , but not link , in which case agent  will end up at the end of the path created by links  and .
(Given that, by supposition,  did not prefer to severe the link  this also implies the existence of link ). But then consider the formation of the link . The only reason that agent  would prefer not to form this link is because there is another agent  and link . Given that the subgraph has a …nite size we conclude that there is always a link that agent  would like to form and given that the proposed links are directed to agent  we have a contradiction.
(b) Consider three agents    and links  and . Thus, both links are directed from agent . Without any loss of generality, consider the creation of link . Agent  should agree to form the link unless there is another agent  and link , but not link , in which case agent  will end up at the end of the path created by links  and . But then consider the formation of the link . The only reason that agent  would prefer not to form this link is because there is another agent  and link . Given that the subgraph has a …nite size we conclude that there is always a link that agent  would like to form and given that the proposed links are directed to agent  we have a contradiction.
The above results imply that any group of three agents in the subgraph form a complete order and thus the subgraph must be complete. ¤ Harary and Moser (1966) have shown that any complete graph that does not have a three-agent cycle is a complete order. This implies that there is one agent who is critical for the subgraph. In order to complete the proof we are going to show that any complete subgraph of size less than  is not stable. There are two cases to consider:
(a) Isolated agents: Suppose that there exists an isolated agent and a complete order subgraph. A link directed from the isolated agent to the critical agent would increase the expected payo¤ of both agents.
(b) A disconnected group of complete order subgraphs: A link, in any direction, between the two critical agents would increase the expected payo¤ of both agents.
Thus, the only stable network is a complete order tournament. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5
Inequality (b) states that the net expected payo¤ corresponding to a node at the end of a directed path of length two is positive. Inequality (c) states that the net expected payo¤ corresponding to a node at the end of a directed path of length three is negative. From Lemma 6 we know that inequality (b) is not su¢cient for the existence of cycles of length three. Lemma 6 also identi…es (A4) as a necessary condition for such cycles. Then as long as inequalities (c) and (A4) are jointly satis…ed then cycles of length three are stable. This will be the case when inequality (d) holds. We will prove the proposition by construction: (a)  is odd: Consider the complete directed network (tournament) where the indegrees and the out-degrees of all nodes are equal to ¡1 2 . The adjacency matrix is given by 1 2 3  agents. There are also links directed to each agent from the previous ¡1 2 . Given that, moving clockwise, there exists a link directed from each agent to the next one there is at least one Hamiltonian cycle (there are many). We also need to show that the shortest path between any two agents  and  does not exceed two. Consider the shortest path from  to . There are two possibilities: If the link is  then the shortest path is equal to one; if the link is  then, by construction, there exists an agent  and links  and , so that the shortest path is equal to two.
(b)  is even: Consider any set of  ¡ 1 agents and construct a completed subgraph as above. Next, create links directed form each agent in the subgraph to the isolated agent.
The only agent who is not critical is the agent who was isolated. This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6
Any complete directed network has a Hamiltonial path (see Leighton and Dijk, 2010) . Consider the expression (1 ¡ )( ¡ 1) ¡   () P ¡1 =0   . The …rst term is equal to the expected bene…t derived by each agent in the complete network. The second term is equal to the lowest possible cost of an agent at the end of a Hamiltonian path (for some agents there might be alternative paths that are shorter and therefore the cost would be higher).
Thus, the expression shows the highest possible expected payo¤ of an agent at the end of the Hamiltonian path. The expression is decreasing in  which completes the proof. ¤
